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Why is it that some societies fail to adopt more productive, readily available technologies?
In these societies, either ¯rms never attempt to introduce more productive technologies, or when
they do, their e®orts are successfully resisted by factor suppliers. This paper examines the role of
market size and free trade in determining whether ¯rms will attempt to adopt more productive
technologies and whether their factor suppliers will resist technological upgrading.
The paper's hypothesis is that population size and free trade facilitate the adoption of more
productive technologies by raising the price elasticity of demand for the ¯rm's product. The higher
price elasticity of demand is critical because it implies a larger increase in revenues following
the price drop associated with the introduction of a more productive technology. As a result,
technology adoptions are more pro¯table, and the earnings of factor suppliers are less likely to
fall. Firms operating in larger markets therefore have a greater incentive to adopt readily available
technologies, and their factor suppliers have a lower incentive to resist them.
This is not to say that there are no other factors that prevent ¯rms in poor countries from intro-
ducing more productive technologies developed in rich countries. Some technologies, particularly
those related to agriculture and mining, may not be suited for the geographic conditions present
in other countries. Access to capital markets is clearly another factor that matters. Similarly, an
illiterate and unskilled workforce may make it unpro¯table for ¯rms to adopt more productive
technologies. Still, there are countless historical and contemporary examples of technologies not
being adopted in some places, that cannot be attributed to any of the aforementioned factors, and
are thus in need of an alternative explanation. This motivates us to explore the role of market
size.
To examine the relation between market size, demand elasticity and technology adoption,
we use a version of Lancaster's (1979) model of trade in ideal varieties. As shown by Helpman
and Krugman (1985) and Hummels and Lugovskyy (2005), this model has the property that the
absolute value of the elasticity of demand is an increasing function of the population size. The
key for generating this result is that the marginal utility of adding one more variety decreases in
the number of varieties available for consumption. As a result, when the economy's size doubles,
the number of varieties increases by less than a factor of 2. This contrasts with the Dixit-Stiglitz
(1977) approach, where the marginal utility of variety is constant, so that the elasticity of demand
1is invariant to the size of the economy. Whereas Helpman and Krugman (1985) and Hummels and
Lugovskyy (2005) examine how population size and trade a®ect the price elasticity of demand
and the number of varieties produced by an economy, we examine how these same elements a®ect
the incentives of ¯rms to adopt a more productive technology and the incentives of their workers
to resist that adoption.
The model consists of a perfectly competitive agricultural sector, a monopolistically competi-
tive industrial sector, and a household sector. Not all households are free to work in all sectors, so
that wages may di®er across sectors. Firms in the industrial sector have the choice between two
technologies, a less productive and a more productive one. Both technologies are freely available,
in the sense that no ¯rm-speci¯c investment is required to adopt them. This does not imply that
¯rms (or workers) always prefer the more productive technology, as there will be a cost associated
with using the superior technology. We consider two alternative ways of modeling this cost.
A ¯rst way in which we model the cost of using the more productive technology is through
the loss of monopoly power over the less productive technology. If a ¯rm upgrades its technology,
any household is allowed to use the less productive technology to produce the ¯rm's variety. This
threat of competitive entry imposes a ceiling on the price an adopting ¯rm can charge for its
variety. When the size of the market is small, the elasticity of demand is low, and the pricing
constraint leads to negative pro¯ts if the ¯rm adopts. Firms therefore prefer to stick to the less
productive technology. However, if the market size is large, the elasticity of demand is high, and
the pricing constraint no longer leads to negative pro¯ts. In that case ¯rms have an incentive to
switch to the more productive technology.
The higher elasticity of demand in larger markets is key to understanding the positive relation
between market size and technology adoption. The elasticity of demand operates through two
channels. First, as the elasticity of demand increases, ¯rms face tougher competition, and the
markup they charge goes down. The lower markup implies a smaller price drop imposed by the
pricing constraint. Second, as the elasticity of demand increases, a given price drop leads to a
greater increase in total revenue. Put di®erently, in more competitive markets lowering the price
translates into a bigger gain in market share.
A second way in which we model the cost of using the more productive technology is to have the
more productive technology displace the original industrial workers. The idea is that an adopting
¯rm can freely hire both agricultural and industrial workers. The original industrial workers no
2longer have a skill advantage when using the more productive technology. This puts downward
pressure on their wages, so that they resist adoption. A con°ict between ¯rms and workers
ensues. Firms are only able to switch to the more productive technology if the pro¯ts generated
by adoption are enough to compensate their workers for the falling wages. The capacity of doing
so depends on the size of the market. In larger markets, the elasticity of demand is greater, and
competition is ¯ercer. The price drop, associated with technology adoption, has a bigger e®ect
on revenues and pro¯ts.
The use of Lancaster ideal variety preferences is surely important for generating the results in
this paper, but it is not essential. What matters, instead, is the positive relation between market
size and the elasticity of demand. Therefore, if we were to use the quasi-linear utility function
with a quadratic sub-utility studied by Ottaviano, Tabuchi and Thisse (2002), the results would
not change. The Dixit-Stiglitz (1977) construct is, however, insu±cient for our purpose. In that
framework there is no elasticity e®ect associated with a larger market size. Certainly, with a
Dixit-Stiglitz setup it is still possible to generate positive welfare and productivity e®ects from an
increase in market size. This has been done by a large number of authors in a variety of ways.
Most look at scale e®ects that are due to the existence of some ¯xed cost to innovation.1 In our
model, there is no such ¯xed cost, as technologies are freely available.
There is one exception in this literature that looks at the adoption of freely available tech-
nologies using the Dixit-Stiglitz construct. Holmes and Schmitz (1998) are able to generate an
elasticity e®ect within that framework. Like us, they show that a larger market size lowers the
resistance to process innovations through a change in the elasticity of demand for an industry's
product. However, there is a key di®erence: in their paper only trade related increases in market
size work to increase the price elasticity of demand and to lower resistance to process innova-
tions. Contrary to empirical evidence, increases in market size due to population growth have no
elasticity e®ect in their model. The dichotomy in their model is an artifact of the Dixit-Stiglitz
structure, as well as a number of special assumptions, such as that technology adoptions occur
at the country level, rather than at the ¯rm level. In contrast, in our model both free trade and
market size stimulate technology adoption. Moreover, the decision of whether to adopt a new
1For example, Rodrigues (2005) obtains this result by assuming increasing returns to specialization. There also
numerous examples within the endogenous growth literature, with a so-called scale-e®ect property, including Romer
(1990), Grossman and Helpman (1991), and Aghion and Howitt (1992).
3technology is taken by individual ¯rms.
Another related paper is Melitz and Ottaviano (2005), who generate an elasticity e®ect using
the Ottaviano, Tabuchi and Thisse (2004) preferences. As in our work, their model does not
predict any dichotomy between the e®ects of free trade and increasing market size. They do not,
however, study technology adoption and resistance. In their model, ¯rms choose to enter a market
and then realize their productivity and marginal production costs. Ex-post, low productivity ¯rms
choose not to produce. Trade and country size raise average productivity by raising the cut-o®
level whereby a ¯rm would choose to exit the industry.2 Though we also emphasize the relation
between market size and elasticity, we focus on a model where technology adoption is a decision,
rather than the outcome of entry and exit and random assignment. In that respect our model is
more similar to Yeaple (2005). However, Yeaple (2005) uses Dixit-Stiglitz preferences, so that the
elasticity of demand is not part of the discussion.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents empirical support for the
mechanism we propose. Section 3 lays out the basic structure of the Lancastarian ideal variety
model studied in Hummels and Lugovskyy (2004). Section 4 and 5 then study the choice of
technologies under di®erent assumptions. In Section 4, the model assumes there is the possibility
of competitive entry; in Section 5, the model assumes the more productive technology displaces
the original industrial workers. Section 6 concludes the paper.
2 Empirical support
The purpose of this section is to provide empirical support for our theory. The empirical
support makes use of aggregate-level, industry-level and ¯rm-level data. Before presenting this
evidence, however, it is instructive to recall those features and predictions of our model that in
their entirety set it apart from the rest of the literature. Our work has vertical innovations and
resistance to those innovations; our work is based on a mechanism whereby larger market size
works to increase the price elasticity of demand; and our work predicts that both population size
and free trade work to eliminate resistance.
2This is essentially the mechanism at hand in Syverson (2004). However, his model does not imply an elasticity
e®ect. Instead, it follows Salop (1979) and assumes consumers have an inelastic demand for a single unit of the
economy's output.
4Process innovations and resistance
Resistance to the introduction of superior technologies is a well-documented and very old phe-
nomenon.3 In the middle ages, the guilds were notorious for blocking the introduction of new
production processes or work practices. Perhaps, no instance of resistance is more famous than
the Luddites who in 1811 and 1812 blocked the attempts of mill owners to introduce labor sav-
ing machines through violence. These same tactics are still in use today, as is evident in a case
documented by Fox and Heller (2000) for a large paper mill in Karelia, Russia.
In both examples the ¯xed or sunk costs with making these changes cannot have been pro-
hibitively large. Otherwise, the plant owners or their managers would not have attempted to
introduce these new technologies in the ¯rst place. Indeed, there are many instances where an
innovation requires no new expenditure, and yet is not adopted. Wolcott (1994), for example,
documents the huge number of strikes by Indian textile workers to stop plans by management
to introduce changes in work rules. These innovations most often were not associated with the
purchase of new machines and equipment, but rather with reorganizations and reassignments of
tasks in the mills. Klebnikov and Waxler (1996), for another example, document the case of the
Volga Paper Company in Russia, in which huge crates placed in a remote part of the factory
containing $100 million in new Austrian-made equipment were left unopened.
Elasticity of demand and market size
As explained in the survey by Tybout (2003), a number of theories, many of which belong to
the new trade literature, argue that when trade liberalization increases, the price elasticity of
demand should rise. Considerable empirical work examining this relation exists. Most studies
focus on the e®ect of trade liberalization on markups, as those theories imply that markups are a
decreasing function of the elasticity of demand.4 Ample empirical evidence, based on plant-level
data, supports this relation (Tybout, 2003).
However, these studies do not directly address the impact of a larger market on the elasticity
of demand. In our theory, the positive e®ect of trade on the elasticity has to do with an increase
in the size of the market. Campbell and Hopenhayn (2005) provide evidence of the retail industry
3Mokyr (1991) provides a comprehensive history of resistance to technological change in the world.
4As price and marginal cost data are typically unavailable, this literature uses a variety of methods to infer
mark-ups (see Tybout, 2003).
5across 225 U.S. cities, consistent with larger markets having lower markups and higher demand
elasticities. Another paper that directly estimates the relation between market size and the price
elasticity of demand is Barron, Umbeck, and Waddell (2002). These authors use gasoline price
and quantity data from individual gas stations in Southern California. They ¯nd that the larger
Los Angeles market is characterized by lower prices and more elastic demand than the smaller
San Diego market.
Population size, free trade and resistance
Here we provide aggregate and industry-level evidence consistent with market size and free trade
having a positive e®ect on economic performance. Much of the empirical literature concludes that
greater openness is associated with faster growth in per capita output or GDP (see, e.g., Sachs
and Warner, 1995, Edwards, 1998, Wacziarg and Welch, 2003, and Alcal¶ a and Ciccone, 2004).5
Of particular interest is Alesina, Spaloare and Wacziarg (2000), who ¯nd that a small population
lowers a country's economic performance only if the country is closed. In other words, trade
provides a way to compensate for small domestic size. At the industry-level, there is the study of
the ready-mix concrete industry by Syverson (2004) in the United States. Using data from the
Census of Manufacturers for a variety of years, he shows that average productivity in ready-mix
concrete is higher in larger geographical markets.
Our theory argues that larger markets and trade lead to better performance because it breaks
down the resistance to technology adoption. Examples where a group that formerly resisted
the adoption of a new technology willingly ended their resistance and embraced the technology
following an increase in its customer base are not well-documented. One case involves scribbling
machines in late 18th century England. According to Randall (1991), the introduction of those
machines in the woolen industry in the West of England in 1791 was met by ¯erce resistance
by workers who feared it would lead to their unemployment. Through physical violence and
intimidation against the mill owners, the workers blocked the introduction of the scribblers. This
resistance continued until the trade boom in 1795. Only after workers could not meet the demand
for their mill's product, did they agree to allow mill owners to introduce these machines.
Individually, none of the facts that we document above set our theory apart from alternative
5See, nonetheless, the critical review of Rodrik and Rodr¶ ³guez (2000).
6theories and papers. However, taken together, they represent a strong case for the mechanism we
propose in this paper. Ours is the only theory that can account for all of this evidence.
3 The model economy
We demonstrate the mechanism at hand using Lancaster's ideal variety model as described
in Hummels and Lugovskyy (2005), Helpman and Krugman (1985), and Lancaster (1979). The
model is static and consists of three sectors: an agricultural sector, an industrial sector, and
a household sector. The agricultural sector is competitive and produces a homogeneous good,
which serves as the economy's num¶ eraire, using labor as its only input. The industrial sector
also uses labor as its only input, but in contrast is monopolistically competitive and produces a
di®erentiated good. The di®erent varieties of the industrial good are located on the unit circle.
There is a single technology to produce the agricultural good, but two available technologies to
produce each di®erentiated industrial good. Those two technologies di®er in their marginal labor
inputs. The household sector is populated by a continuum of households of measure N, distributed
uniformly around the unit circle. A household's location on the unit circle corresponds to the
variety of the di®erentiated good that it most strongly prefers. Households supply labor to ¯rms
in the economy and use the income generated by this activity to buy the agricultural good and
the di®erentiated goods.
In what follows we describe each of these three sectors in detail. In addition, we analyze the
utility maximization problem of households, and the pro¯t maximization problem of agricultural
¯rms. For now, we do not describe the pro¯t maximization problem of industrial ¯rms, because it
depends on the way we introduce the cost of using the more productive technology. We distinguish
between two di®erent costs, and discuss those in detail in Section 4 and Section 5.
3.1 Household sector
Preferences
A household's utility depends on its consumption of the agricultural good and the di®erentiated
industrial goods. We denote a household's consumption of the agricultural good by ca and its
consumption of the di®erentiated good v by cv, where v 2 V . Households are uniformly distributed
7along the unit circle. Each household's location on the unit circle corresponds to its ideal variety
of the industrial good. The farther away a particular variety of the industrial good, v, lies from a
household's ideal variety, ~ v, the lower the utility derived from a unit of consumption of the good.
Let dv~ v denote the shortest arc distance between variety v and the household's ideal variety ~ v.
Following Hummels and Lugovskyy (2005), the utility of a type ~ v household is
U = c1¡®
a [u(cvjv 2 V )]® (1)
where








In equation (1), ® is a parameter that determines the expenditure share of the household between
the agricultural good and the di®erentiated good. In equation (2), the term 1+d
¯
v;~ v is Lancaster's
compensation function, i.e., the quantity of variety v that gives the household the same utility as
one unit of its ideal variety ~ v. The parameter ¯ determines how fast utility diminishes with the
distance to the ideal variety. As is standard with Lancaster preferences, we restrict the compen-
sation function to be convex, and set ¯ to be greater than 1. This implies that compensation rises
at an increasing rate as the household moves away from its ideal variety.
Endowments
Each household is endowed with one unit of time. Households may di®er with respect to how
they can use their time endowment, namely, whether they can work in the agricultural sector, the
industrial sector with the inferior technology, or the industrial sector with the superior technology.
For the purpose at hand, it will be su±cient to distinguish between two types of households, type-
1 and type-2. For now, we do not further specify what these two types are, as this will depend
on the di®erent assumptions made in Sections 4 and 5. To ensure that a symmetric equilibrium
exists, we assume that measure N1 of type-1 households and measure N2 = N ¡ N1 of type-2
households are each uniformly distributed along the unit circle.
3.2 Agricultural sector
There is a single technology to produce the agricultural good. It uses labor as its only input
and exhibits constant returns to scale. Let Qa denote the quantity of agricultural output and let
8La denote the labor input. Then
Qa = ­aLa (3)
where ­a is agricultural TFP.
3.3 Industrial sector
Each di®erentiated good can be produced with either a less productive or a more productive
technology. Labor is the only input, and there is a ¯xed cost · modeled in labor units associated
with operating either technology. The two technologies di®er solely in their marginal labor inputs.
For the inferior technology the marginal labor input is Á1, whereas for the superior technology it
is Á2, with Á1 > Á2. Let Lv denote the total labor input of a ¯rm producing variety v, and let Qv
be the output of such a ¯rm. Then, the output associated with using technology i = 1;2 is
Qv = Á¡1
i [Lv ¡ ·] (4)
3.4 Household utility maximization
Given that households may di®er in the use of their time endowment, they may di®er in their
incomes. Let w1 denote the wage earned by a household of type 1 and w2 the wage paid to a
household of type 2.6 Cobb-Douglas preferences imply that each household spends a fraction 1¡®
of its income on the agricultural good, and the remaining fraction ® on the di®erentiated goods.
That is
ci




v = ®wi if i = 1;2 (6)
The sub-utility function given by equation (2) implies that each household buys only one di®er-
entiated good. As such, the quantity of the variety v0 purchased by a household satis¯es
cv0 = ®wi=pv0 (7)





6Free entry into the industrial sector ensures that ¯rms there make zero pro¯ts. Thus, the only income of a
household is its labor income.
9It follows immediately that this household only consumes that variety v which minimizes pv(1 +
d
¯
v~ v), so that
v0 = argmin[pv(1 + d
¯
v;~ v)jv 2 V ]
Now that we have derived an individual household's demand, we can determine aggregate
household demand for a given variety. The expression of total demand for any variety is indepen-
dent of the technology used by the ¯rms. For this reason, we can derive the demand for a ¯rm's
product before examining its choice of technology. The aggregate demand facing a ¯rm producing
variety v depends on the location on the unit circle of its nearest competitor to its left, s, and to
its right, z, as well as on the prices charged by those ¯rms, ps and pz. If the price of variety v
is pv, then the household on the unit circle who is just indi®erent between buying variety v and
variety s is identi¯ed by location u, which satis¯es
ps(1 + d¯
su) = pv(1 + d¯
uv)
Similarly, the household on the unit circle who is just indi®erent between buying variety v and
variety z is identi¯ed by location y, which satis¯es
pz(1 + d¯
yz) = pv(1 + d¯
yv)
Given these prices and locations, it follows that the customer base of industry v is the compact
set of households with ideal variety located between u and y. More speci¯cally, the share of
customers served by industry v equals the shortest arc distance between variety v and u, duv, plus
the shortest arc distance between variety v and y, dyv.
Household preferences imply that each household spends a fraction ® of its total income on
a single variety. As type-1 and type-2 households are each uniformly distributed along the unit
circle, it follows that total demand for ¯rm v's product is
Qv =
(duv + dyv)®[w1N1 + w2N2]
pv
In a symmetric equilibrium, duv = dyv and dsv = dzv. In that case, denote the distance between
¯rm v and the indi®erent household by d0, the distance between ¯rm v and its nearest competitor
to the right (and to the left) by d, and the price charged by these competitors by p. Then, ¯rm





10and the condition that determines the indi®erent customer can be re-written as
p[1 + (d ¡ d0)¯] = pv[1 + d0¯] (9)
3.5 Agricultural ¯rm equilibrium conditions
The agricultural sector is competitive. Let wa denote the wage rate paid to a household
working in the agricultural sector. The problem of an agricultural ¯rm is to maximize pro¯ts,
namely, ­aLa ¡ waLa. The ¯rst order necessary condition is
wa = ­a
4 Loss of monopoly control over the less productive technology
When an industrial ¯rm produces a certain variety, it gets the monopoly right over the technol-
ogy to produce that variety. It is free to use the less productive or the more productive technology.
However, if it opts for the more productive technology, it forfeits the monopoly right over the less
productive technology. In that case, any household is free to enter the market, and use the less
productive technology, without incurring the ¯xed cost, to produce the ¯rm's variety. This risk
of competitive entry imposes a cost on the adopting ¯rm in the form of a pricing constraint.
Though technology adoption imposes a pricing constraint, it does not require a ¯rm-speci¯c
¯xed investment, which would imply the use of resources | labor or goods | to switch to the
more productive technology. Such a resource cost would lead to a scale-economy e®ect: as a
larger economy would allow ¯rms to spread the ¯xed cost among a larger customer base, it would
be more likely to adopt the superior technology. We abstract from this type of adoption cost,
because we wish to highlight that it is not needed to generate a positive relation between market
size and technology adoption. Our focus is on why technologies which are freely available | and
thus do not require any ¯xed investment to adopt | are sometimes resisted.
To understand the threat of competitive entry, it is important to specify the constraints on
the use of the households' time endowment. Type-2 households are the only ones that can be
employed by industrial ¯rms, whereas type-1 households are constrained to be laborers in the
11agricultural sector. However, if any industrial ¯rm switches to the more productive technology,
type-1 households are allowed to start producing the ¯rm's variety as self-employed workers, using
the less productive technology. To deter competitive entry, an adopting ¯rm will therefore have
an incentive to charge a low enough price. This explains why the loss of monopoly control leads
to a pricing constraint.
In what follows, we ¯rst characterize the relevant problem of industrial sector ¯rms, and then
describe the set of necessary conditions for a symmetric equilibrium without technology adoption
and with technology adoption. The household utility maximizing conditions and the agricultural
¯rm pro¯t maximizing conditions are the ones derived in Section 3. Next, we examine how the
equilibrium properties of the model change as the population increases. This we do via a series
of computation. We are particularly interested in understanding how the incentive to switch to
the more productive technology depends on the size of the market.
4.1 Pro¯t maximization of industrial ¯rms
A ¯rm chooses its variety and its price, as well as the technology, so as to maximize its pro¯ts
subject to the demand for its product, taking as given the choices of other ¯rms. In other words,
¯rms behave non-cooperatively. In case a ¯rm uses the more productive technology, it faces the
additional constraint that entry will occur by households using the less productive technology if
it sets too high a price for its variety. Increasing returns to scale imply that each ¯rm produces
a di®erent variety. However, ¯rms in the industrial sector are free to enter and exit, because
the ¯xed cost is only incurred if a ¯rm has positive production. This guarantees pro¯ts of all
¯rms must be zero in equilibrium. The zero pro¯t condition e®ectively pins down the number of
varieties produced in the economy.
As is standard, we will focus exclusively on symmetric zero pro¯t Nash equilibria, although
other non-symmetric equilibria cannot be excluded. In a symmetric equilibrium, all industrial
¯rms are equally spaced along the unit circle, charge the same price, employ the same number of
workers, and use the same technology. In this particular framework, there will be two possible
equilibria, one where all industrial ¯rms use the inferior technology, and another where they have
all switched to the superior technology.
12The no adoption case
In the case a ¯rm does not use the superior technology, its pro¯t maximization problem is
pvQv ¡ wxLv
subject to the variety's demand (8) and the production technology (4) with Ái = Á1 and wx denot-
ing the wage of industrial workers. As in the standard monopoly problem, the pro¯t maximizing











Given the variety's demand (8) it is easy to show that










p¯(d ¡ d0)¯¡1 + pv¯d0¯¡1
Using this result together with equation (11) gives us
1 ¡ " =
¡(1 + d0¯)pv
[p¯(d ¡ d0)¯¡1 + pv¯d0¯¡1]d0
In a symmetric no adoption equilibrium, pv = p and d0 = d=2, so that











In the case all ¯rms use the superior technology, the pro¯t maximization is subject to an additional
constraint. If a ¯rm adopts the superior technology, then any household can use its own labor
to produce the same variety with the inferior technology, without having to incur the ¯xed cost.
Type-1 households will have an incentive to do so if the income they could earn from producing
13variety v with the old technology, pv=Á1, is greater than their wages in the agricultural sector, wa.
A similar condition applies to type-2 households: they would do the same if pv=Á1 is greater than
wx. This entry threat of competitive ¯rms puts an e®ective ceiling on the price the ¯rm using the
superior technology can charge, pv · minfwaÁ1;wxÁ1g.
As the maximization problem for a ¯rm is the same except for this additional constraint, the





4.2 Zero industrial pro¯t condition
The number of varieties in equilibrium is determined by the condition that industrial ¯rms
earn zero pro¯ts. Pro¯ts of a ¯rm using technology Ái can be written as pvQv ¡ wx(· + QvÁi).
In the symmetric equilibrium with no adoption, the zero pro¯t condition is
Qv = ·Á¡1
1 (" ¡ 1)
This is derived by substituting the pro¯t maximizing price (10) into the pro¯t equation and setting
pro¯ts to zero. In the symmetric equilibrium with adoption this condition is
Qv =
(
wx·=[minfwaÁ1;wxÁ1g ¡ wxÁ2] if pv = minfwaÁ1;wxÁ1g
·Á¡1
2 (" ¡ 1) if pv = wxÁ2"=(" ¡ 1)
Note that in a symmetric equilibrium the number of varieties is equal to the inverse of the arc
distance between neighboring ¯rms on the unit circle. Thus, if d is the distance between any two
varieties, then the number of varieties in a symmetric equilibrium is d¡1.
4.3 Symmetric equilibrium with no adoption
We are now ready to de¯ne a symmetric equilibrium with no adoption.







a ) that satis¯es
1. ci
a = (1 ¡ ®)wi i = 1;2 (utility maximization of type i household)
2. N1c1
a + N2c2
a = ­aLa (agricultural market clears)
143. wa = ­a (pro¯t maximization agricultural ¯rms)
4. Lv=d = N2 (industrial labor market clears)
5. La = N1 (agricultural labor market clears)
6. " = 1 + 1
2¯(2
d)¯ + 1
2¯ (de¯nition of elasticity)
7. p =
wxÁ1"
"¡1 (pro¯t maximization of industrial ¯rm)
8. Qv = ·Á¡1
1 (" ¡ 1) (zero pro¯t condition)
9. Qv =
d®[waN1+wxN2]
p (demand for variety v)
10. Qv = Á¡1
1 (Lv ¡ ·) (supply of variety v)















" = 1 +
(1 + d0¯)pv
[p¤
v¯(d¤ ¡ d0)¯¡1 + pv¯d0¯¡1]d0
The last condition in the above de¯nition says that no ¯rm should have an incentive to
deviate and adopt the superior technology. Put di®erently, no ¯rm should make positive pro¯ts
by switching to the superior technology. If not, this would not be a Nash equilibrium. The
critical component of this last condition is the pricing constraint pv · minfw¤
aÁ1;w¤
xÁ1g. In the
absence of the pricing constraint, ¯rms would always want to deviate, given there is no ¯rm-speci¯c
investment required to adopt the more productive technology.
We now look at the incentive to deviate in further detail. If a ¯rm producing variety v adopts
the new technology, its pro¯t maximizing price pv changes. This, in turn, a®ects its customer
base. If d¤ is the equilibrium distance between two neighboring ¯rms, then a share d0 will buy from
the deviating ¯rm, and a share d¤¡d0 from its neighbor. Given that each ¯rm has two neighbors,
the total customer share of the deviating ¯rm is 2d0. The household located at a distance d0 from
15the deviating ¯rm is indi®erent between buying from the deviating ¯rm or from its neighbor:
p¤(1 + (d¤ ¡ d0)¯) = pv(1 + d0¯) (13)





p¤¯(d¤ ¡ d0)¯¡1 + pv¯d0¯¡1 (14)







Di®erentiating Qv in (15) with respect to pv, and using expression (14) allows us to derive an
expression for the deviating ¯rm's elasticity:
"v = 1 +
(1 + d0¯)pv
[p¤
v¯(d¤ ¡ d0)¯¡1 + pv¯d0¯¡1]d0 (16)







However, as argued before, in reality the ¯rm faces a constraint: it will never want to charge a
price that gives other households an incentive to start using the ¯rm's old technology. As a result,
pv can never be greater than minfw¤
aÁ1;w¤















The deviating ¯rm's pro¯t can then be written as:
¼v = pvQv ¡ w¤
x(· + Á2Qv) (19)
where Qv can be computed from equations (13) and (15) and pv is given by (18). The de¯nition
of a symmetric equilibrium with no adoption requires that the deviating ¯rm's pro¯t is negative.
4.4 Symmetric equilibrium with adoption
By analogy, a symmetric equilibrium with adoption can now be de¯ned as:







a ) that satis¯es
1. ci
a = (1 ¡ ®)wi i = 1;2 (utility maximization of type i household)
2. N1c1
a + N2c2
a = ­aLa (agricultural market clears)
3. wa = w1 = ­a (pro¯t maximization agricultural ¯rms)
4. Lv=d = N2 (industrial labor market clears)
5. La = N1 (agricultural labor market clears)
6. " = 1 + 1
2¯(2
¿)¯ + 1
2¯ (de¯nition of elasticity)
7. pv = minfminfwaÁ1;wxÁ1g;
wxÁ2"
"¡1 g (pro¯t maximization of industrial ¯rm)
8. Qv =
(
wx·=[minfwaÁ1;wxÁ1g ¡ wxÁ2] if pv = minfwaÁ1;wxÁ1g




p (demand for variety v)
10. Qv = Á¡1
2 (Lv ¡ ·) (supply of variety v)










p¤[1 + (d¤ ¡ d0)¯] = pv[1 + d0¯]
" = 1 +
(1 + d0¯)pv
[p¤
v¯(d¤ ¡ d0)¯¡1 + pv¯d0¯¡1]d0
To be a Nash equilibrium, no ¯rm should have an incentive to go back to the inferior technology.
This is the meaning of the last condition in the above de¯nition. It is important to note that
by deviating, we assume a ¯rm regains monopoly control over the use of the inferior technology.
No self-employed household in this case can use its own labor to produce the deviating industry's
output using the inferior technology. E®ectively, by deviating a ¯rm is trading o® a higher
marginal cost with eliminating the pricing constraint.
174.5 Numerical experiments
In this section we examine how the decision of industrial ¯rms to use the more productive
technology depends on the size of the economy's population. To do so, we ¯rst compute the
prices and allocations that satisfy all but the no deviation condition of the symmetric equilibrium
with adoption and the prices and allocations that satisfy all but the no deviation condition of the
symmetric equilibrium with no adoption. We do this for a given population and parametrization of
the model. We then check if the no-deviation condition for each symmetric equilibrium is satis¯ed
for the respective candidate set of prices and allocations. If it is, then we conclude that such a
symmetric equilibrium exists. We then change the population size, and repeat these steps.
There are two main ¯ndings. First, for smaller population size economies, the no deviating
condition for a symmetric equilibrium with no adoption is satis¯ed, and thus such an equilibrium
exists. However, as the population size increases beyond some level, the no deviation condition
is violated. When the economy reaches that threshold, ¯rms switch to the more productive
technology. Second, the symmetric equilibrium with adoption only exists if the population size is
large enough. For smaller economies the no deviating condition of the equilibrium with adoption
is violated. In other words, for smaller size economies, the only symmetric equilibrium is the one
that uses the less productive technology, whereas for larger size economies, the only symmetric
equilibrium is the one that uses the more productive technology.
The positive relation between market size and demand elasticity is key to understanding why
larger markets stimulate the adoption of more productive technologies. That elasticity of demand







2¯(¯ + 1)"¯ ¡ (2¯ + 1)¯"¯¡1 (20)
Since " > 1, this expression is positive, so that an increase in N2 leads to a greater elasticity of
demand.
There are two reasons why the low elasticity of demand in small markets has a negative
e®ect on technology adoption. First, when the elasticity is low, competition is weak, and the
pre-adoption markup (and price) is high. In that case, the pricing constraint, required to deter
competitive entry, imposes a relatively large price drop if a ¯rm decides to adopt. As a result,
7By an increase in market size, we refer to a proportional increase in the measures of N, N1 and N2.
18pro¯ts from adopting are more likely to be negative. Second, when the elasticity is low, a given
price drop leads to a smaller increase in total revenues. In an environment with relatively weak
competition, lower prices do not lead to much gain in market share. These two forces explain
why in small sized markets the entry constraint imposes a large cost on the adopting ¯rm, enough
so that pro¯ts are negative. As the market size increases, the elasticity of demand goes up, and
the entry constraint imposes a smaller cost on the adopting ¯rm. Eventually, when the market
size becomes su±ciently large, ¯rms switch to the more productive technology, as the pricing
constraint does no longer prevent them from making positive pro¯ts.
We now report the ¯ndings for one parametrization of the model. The parameter values,
which are reported in Table 1, were not chosen within the framework of some calibration exercise.
Rather, they were chosen with the sole purpose of illustrating the mechanism at hand in the
clearest possible way. The `nice' feature of this experiment is that for all population sizes there
exists a symmetric equilibrium. In particular, there exists a population size, N¤ = 116, such
that for N < N¤ only the symmetric equilibrium with no adoption exists and for N > N¤ only
the symmetric equilibrium with adoption exists. Thus, for su±ciently small economies, the only
equilibrium is one with no adoption. For su±ciently large economies, the only equilibrium is one
with adoption.
Table 1: Parameter values (¯rst experiment)
¯ = 1:05 ® = :60
· = :70 ­a = 1:0
N1 = :4N N2 = :6N
Á1 = :1079 Á2 = :103
To provide a more complete picture of the properties of the model, Table 2 reports for di®erent
levels of population the distance between varieties, the elasticity of demand, the price of the
industrial goods, the ratio of industrial to agricultural wages, and the average real wage. Note
that the average real wage refers to the indirect utility of a household with an average wage







19To better understand the e®ect of technology adoption, the real wage has been normalized to 1
for the largest economy that does not adopt the more productive technology.
Table 2: Symmetric equilibrium properties
N d " pv wx=wa Real wages
Symmetric equilibrium with no adoption
25 .259 5.5 .1316 1.0 .921
75 .142 9.1 .1212 1.0 .983
Symmetric equilibrium with adoption (binding)
125 .206 6.7 .1079 1.0 1.045
175 .147 8.9 .1079 1.0 1.053
225 .114 11.1 .1079 1.0 1.058
275 .093 13.4 .1079 1.0 1.060
325 .079 15.6 .1079 1.0 1.062
375 .069 17.9 .1079 1.0 1.064
425 .060 20.2 .1079 1.0 1.065
475 .055 22.3 .1078 1.0 1.066
Symmetric equilibrium with adoption (nonbinding)
525 .052 23.4 .1076 1.0 1.068
575 .050 24.5 .1074 1.0 1.069
625 .048 25.5 .1072 1.0 1.071
675 .046 26.5 .1070 1.0 1.072
725 .044 27.5 .1069 1.0 1.073
775 .043 28.4 .1068 1.0 1.074
825 .041 29.3 .1066 1.0 1.075
875 .040 30.2 .1065 1.0 1.076
925 .039 31.1 .1064 1.0 1.077
975 .038 31.9 .1063 1.0 1.077
Table 2 is divided into three parts. For small levels of population, N · 75, all ¯rms use the in-
ferior technology. For intermediate levels of population, 125 · N · 425, all ¯rms use the superior
technology, but the price ceiling to keep other households from entering the market is binding.
For large levels of population, N ¸ 475, all ¯rms continue to use the superior technology, but the
price ceiling ceases to be binding. As the size of the market increases, the price of the industrial
20good falls, the elasticity of demand rises, and the average real wage goes up. Those results depend
partly on the market size becoming larger; however, adopting the superior technology reinforces
them.
Even if there is no technology adoption, in Lancaster type models larger markets have two
positive e®ects. They increase average ¯rm size. This leads to more e±cient production, lower
prices and higher real wages. Larger markets also generate more varieties. This allows the average
household to be located closer to its ideal variety. This contributes to a further rise in average
real wages. Note that the relative wage of industrial workers is constant. This is an artifact of
the parameter values and the result that in a symmetric equilibrium wx = ®N1=((1¡®)N2). One
other result draws attention. When the population increases from 75 to 125, and ¯rms switch to
the superior technology, there is a drop in the elasticity and in the number of varieties produced.
This may seem odd. However, this happens because ¯rms cannot sell above the price ceiling.
For economies just above the threshold of N¤ = 116, this implies a substantial price drop, which
explains why certain ¯rms are forced out of the market.








Figure 1: E®ect of technology adoption on real wages. The full curve takes into account the e®ect
of technology adoption, whereas the dashed curve does not.
The adoption of the more productive technology in larger economies reinforces the positive
e®ects of market size on real wages. To isolate the e®ect of switching to the more productive
technology, Figure 1 compares the average real wage from Table 2 (full curve) to what the average
real wage would be in the absence of technology adoption (dashed curve). UntilN¤ = 116 the two
curves coincide, because below that threshold ¯rms do not have an incentive to switch to the more
21advanced technology. Once we reach the threshold though, ¯rms adopt the superior technology,
and the utility jumps up. The di®erence between the two curves represents the contribution of
technology upgrading to the average real wage.
To see how the incentive to adopt the more productive technology depends on the market
size, consider the following experiment. Assume that an adopting ¯rm redistributes all pro¯ts
(or losses) to its original workers. Their real wages fall or rise, depending on whether adoption
is pro¯table or not. Figure 2 plots the relative change in those real wages in function of market
size. Consistent with what we said before, for a population size N¤ < 116, adoption would imply
losses, so real wages would drop. In that case, no ¯rm would wish to switch to the more productive
technology. Above that threshold, however, adoption leads to pro¯ts, and thus higher real wages.
This positive e®ect is increasing in the size of the market.









  Figure 2: Relative e®ect of technology adoption on the real wages of workers in an adopting ¯rm.
One possible criticism to this model is that workers never resist technology adoption. A ¯rm
will only choose to switch to the more productive technology if it does not make any losses after
paying its workers at least the going market wage. Therefore, although ¯rms may decide to adopt
or not adopt the more advanced technology, they do not face resistance on the part of workers.
As resistance by factor suppliers is a well documented phenomenon, in the next section we modify
the model to allow for antagonism between workers and ¯rms.
225 Resistance to technology adoption
In this version of the model ¯rms no longer lose their monopoly power over the less productive
technology when switching to the more productive one. As a result, the pricing constraint disap-
pears, implying that industrial ¯rms now always have an incentive to adopt the more productive
technology, regardless of the economy's population size.
Although ¯rms always will prefer the more productive technology, their workers may resist.
When upgrading its technology, we assume a ¯rm can freely hire type-1 as well as type-2 house-
holds, who are both equally adept at using the more productive technology. The underlying
assumption is that type-2 households are skilled in the original (less productive) technology, but
have no advantage in operating the new (more productive) technology. By switching to the more
advanced technology, type-2 households lose their privileged position. Assuming wages are lower
in agriculture than in industry, those households stand to lose in the form of falling wages if their
¯rm decides to adopt the more productive technology.
To try to break workers' resistance, a ¯rm that wishes to switch to the more productive tech-
nology redistributes part of the pro¯ts from adoption to its original workers. However, bargaining
over how to split up the cake is costly. We assume an exogenous share ° of the pro¯ts is lost in
the process. As a result, workers receive a maximum share 1¡° of the adopting ¯rm's pro¯ts.8 If
that share is enough to compensate the original workers for their falling wages, resistance breaks
down, and adoption occurs. If not, ¯rms continue to use the less productive technology.
In the analysis that follows, we limit ourselves to studying the incentive of ¯rms to deviate from
the symmetric equilibrium with no adoption.9 After de¯ning the equilibrium with no adoption,
we use numerical examples to illustrate how adoption depends on the size of the market.
8One could think of ° as representing union dues. For a large number of unions in the United States membership
dues are set as a certain percentage of a worker's earnings.
9Since the focus is on the adoption of more advanced technologies, we refrain from discussing the incentive
of ¯rms to deviate from the symmetric equilibrium with adoption. In fact, it would not be entirely obvious how
to determine the no-deviation condition in that case. Adopting ¯rms typically employ both type-1 and type-2
households. Since their respective incentives to deviate are di®erent, the no-deviation condition would depend on
which households have the power within the ¯rm.
235.1 Symmetric equilibrium with no adoption
If a ¯rm did not face resistance from workers, it would always adopt the more productive
technology. The reason is two-fold: the technology is better, Á2 < Á1, and the ¯rm can hire
workers at the agricultural wage rate, which we assume to be lower.10 The ¯rm's workers will
only give up resistance if the share 1¡° of the pro¯ts generated by adoption is enough to at least
maintain their wages
wa + ¼(1 ¡ °)=Lv ¸ wx
where Lv refers to the original number of workers in the ¯rm, and ¼ is the pro¯t of the deviating
¯rm. Note that wa = ­a and wx = ®N1=((1 ¡ ®)N2) are the respective wages that would prevail
in a symmetric equilibrium with no adoption.
Given the assumptions of the model, the de¯nition of the symmetric equilibrium with no
adoption is as follows:
Definition 3 A Symmetric Equilibrium with No Adoption (with workers' resistance) is a vec-






a ) that satis¯es Conditions 1-10 of
De¯nition 1 and
11'. Workers ¯nd it pro¯table to block the adoption of the superior technology. Namely, w¤
a +
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v[1 + (d¤ ¡ d0)¯] = pv[1 + d0¯]
" = 1 +
(1 + d0¯)pv
[p¤
v¯(d¤ ¡ d0)¯¡1 + pv¯d0¯¡1]d0
This last condition says that the symmetric equilibrium with no adoption is a Nash equilibrium
if no ¯rm has an incentive to deviate and switch to the more productive technology. For this to
be the case, the pro¯ts generated by adoption, net of a share °, should not be enough to maintain
the earnings of the original workers.
10This is so as long as the parameters of the model satisfy wx = ®N1=((1 ¡ ®)N2) > ­a = wa.
245.2 Numerical Experiments
In this section we examine how market size a®ects the incentives of workers to resist the
adoption of the more productive technology. For a given parametrization we compute the prices
and allocations that satisfy all but the no-deviation condition of the symmetric equilibrium with
no adoption. We then determine whether a particular ¯rm has the incentive to deviate. If no ¯rm
chooses to deviate, we conclude that the symmetric equilibrium with no adoption exists. For such
an equilibrium to exist, workers must resist technology adoption. We then analyze how resistance
depends on the size of the economy by varying the population, holding the fraction of type-1 and
type-2 households in the population constant.
We now report the ¯ndings for one parametrization of the model. As before, the parameter
values were not chosen within the framework of some calibration exercise. Their sole purpose is
to illustrate the mechanism at hand. Table 3 gives the parameter values used.
Table 3: Parameter values (second experiment)
¯ = 1:01 ® = :615
· = :25 ­a = 1:0
N1 = :4N N2 = :6N
Á1 = :101 Á2 = :1
° = :25
Figure 3 represents the change in the real wage of the original workers if a ¯rm adopts the
new technology. As can be seen, if the population size is below N¤ = 33, deviating and adopting
the more productive technology would lead to a drop in the original workers' earnings. Therefore,
below that threshold, workers resist adoption, and the symmetric equilibrium with no adoption
exists. Once the population size rises above that cuto®, the original workers gain from technology
adoption. As a result, their resistance breaks down, and ¯rms switch to the more productive
technology.
Here again, the positive relation between market size and elasticity of demand is key to un-
derstanding why larger economies are more likely to adopt the superior technology. To see this,
Table 4 reports a number of relevant statistics in function of the size of the population. From










  Figure 3: Technology adoption: e®ect on real wages of original workers
the second column we see that as the size of the market increases, the elasticity of demand goes
up. Neighboring varieties become closer substitutes. This means that for a given price drop,11
output (and total revenue) go up by more, translating into greater pro¯ts. This can be seen in
column 4, which reports the pro¯ts of an adopting ¯rm per original worker. Although pro¯ts
are always positive, they may not be enough to compensate the original workers for their falling
wages. Indeed, because adopting ¯rms can now hire type-1 households, earnings of the original
workers drop. For generated pro¯ts to be able to compensate those workers, the market size needs
to be large enough. This is re°ected in column 3, which reports the proportional change in the
real earnings of the original workers. Once the market size reaches the threshold N¤ = 33, ¯rms
are able to buy out workers, and will ¯nd it pro¯table to adopt the more productive technology.
We emphasize that there is nothing special about this particular parametrization. We ex-
perimented with a number of other parametrizations and found qualitatively the same results.
Note, however, that it is important for ° to be strictly positive. The reason is straightforward.
Take a ¯rm that uses the less productive technology, and makes zero pro¯ts in equilibrium. If
it were to pay its workers at the lower agricultural wage and maintain all other choice variables
constant, pro¯ts per worker would exactly be equal to the di®erence between the industrial and
the agricultural wage. If now that same ¯rm were to use the more productive (and thus less costly)
technology and maintain the other choice variables constant, its pro¯ts per worker would exceed
11As can be seen from column 5, the optimal price drop of a deviating ¯rm does not vary much with market size.
26Table 4: Symmetric equilibrium properties
Population Elasticity Change in Pro¯ts Change in
N " real wages per worker industrial price
Symmetric equilibrium with no adoption
5 4.3 -0.0062 0.058 -0.041
25 8.60 -0.0012 0.064 -0.038
Deviation and adoption of more productive technology
45 11.27 0.0016 0.067 -0.038
65 13.40 0.0038 0.069 -0.037
85 15.21 0.0057 0.071 -0.037
105 16.83 0.0073 0.073 -0.037
125 18.30 0.0088 0.074 -0.037
145 19.66 0.0101 0.076 -0.037
165 20.93 0.0114 0.077 -0.037
185 22.12 0.0126 0.078 -0.037
205 23.25 0.0137 0.080 -0.037
the di®erence between the industrial and the agricultural wage. Therefore, if ° = 0, all pro¯ts
would be redistributed, workers' earnings would exceed the original industrial wage, and there
would never be any resistance to technology adoption. Although this implies that for workers to
oppose more productive technologies ° should be strictly positive, its value need not be large in
any sense. Parameters can be chosen in such a way for resistance to arise for values of ° of, say,
0.02, consistent with the kind of union dues paid by some workers in the United States.
6 Concluding remarks
This paper has explored how the elasticity of demand in larger markets may be key in un-
derstanding why free trade and market size stimulates technology adoption. If the elasticity of
demand is high, the drop in the price, following the adoption of a more productive technology,
translates into a substantial increase in revenues and pro¯ts. This makes it more likely for ¯rms
to upgrade their technology. Likewise, in larger markets workers are less likely to resist adoption.
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